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Correcting an Evident Error:
A Plea to Revise Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
WILLIAM J. ACEVES*
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court held that foreign
corporations are not subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”). Written by Justice Kennedy, the highly fractured opinion offered
several reasons for its holding. Although commentators have already
criticized various aspects of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, one point has not
received meaningful consideration and merits correction. In his plurality
opinion, Justice Kennedy attached significance to the placement of the
Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) as a statutory note to the ATS in
the U.S. Code. In so doing, he disregarded longstanding practice and
black letter law that the placement of a statutory note in the U.S. Code by
the Office of Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC”) does not have any
substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or application.
This error merits correction by the Court for several reasons. Although it
undoubtedly influenced Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the ATS, its
implications extend beyond this case. It will affect future ATS and TVPA
cases. It also creates uncertainty over the status of the countless statutory
notes that populate the federal code. And, it raises constitutional concerns
by attaching legal significance to OLRC’s placement decisions.
INTRODUCTION
There are hundreds of federal departments, agencies, and offices.1
Many of them are well known; others operate in relative obscurity. These
entities exist within each branch of the federal government. Despite their
obscurity (or perhaps because of it), some of these entities can wield
significant power. In 1992, one such entity made a decision that had a

* William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California Western
School of Law. Professor Aceves participated as amicus counsel in several cases
described in this Article, including Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC. He appreciates the
assistance of the Office of Law Revision Counsel, the Office of the Federal Register, and
the library staff at California Western School of Law. William S. Dodge, Jessica Fink,
Barbara Glennan, and Beth Stephens offered helpful comments on early drafts. Regina
Calvario, Warsame Hassan, Ash Kargaran, and Melia Thompson-Dudiak provided
excellent research assistance. All errors and opinions are the author’s sole responsibility.
1
See Hearing on “Examining the Federal Regulatory System to Improve Accountability,
Transparency and Integrity” Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015)
(prepared statement of Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee)
(“The Federal Register indicates there are over 430 departments, agencies, and subagencies in the federal government. And the pronouncements of this ever-expanding
administrative state impact nearly every aspect of Americans’ daily lives.”).
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surprising impact on the Supreme Court’s April 2018 ruling in Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC.2
In Jesner, the Supreme Court held that foreign corporations are not
subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).3 Written by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the highly fractured opinion offered several
reasons for its holding. According to the majority, federal courts should be
reluctant to extend judicially created rights of action under the ATS,
particularly in cases involving foreign corporations. Commentators have
criticized various aspects of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, including its
excessive deference to the corporate form and its misunderstanding of how
international norms are enforced.4 But, one aspect of the opinion has not
received meaningful consideration. Given the arcane nature of statutory
placement, this is, perhaps, understandable.
The Office of Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC” or “Office”) operates
within the U.S. House of Representatives.5 When federal laws are enacted,
the Office is responsible for the placement of these new laws in the United
States Code (“Code”). On some occasions, Congress indicates where new
legislation should be placed within the Code. On other occasions,
Congress is silent, and placement of new legislation in the Code is left to
OLRC. When OLRC makes these decisions, they are not meant to have
any substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or
application.6 Accordingly, courts cannot attach any legal significance to
the specific placement of these new laws in the Code.

2

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
Id. at 27. The Alien Tort Statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
4
See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Jesner v. Arab Bank: The Supreme Court Preserves the
Possibility of Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 26,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55404/jesner-v-arab-bank-supreme-court-preservespossibility-human-rights-suits-u-s-corporations/
[https://perma.cc/AHX8-CW9M];
Samuel Moyn, Time to Pivot? Thoughts on Jesner v. Arab Bank, LAWFARE (Apr. 25,
2018),
https://lawfareblog.com/time-pivot-thoughts-jesner-v-arab-bank
[https://perma.cc/DY2Y-7UEB]; Beth Stephens, Five Things I Don’t Like About the
Jesner
Opinion,
HUM.
RTS
AT
HOME
BLOG
(Apr.
29,
2018),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2018/04/five-things-i-dont-like-aboutthe-jesner-decision.html [https://perma.cc/L6GT-A67K]; Christopher A. Whytock,
Whither Human Rights Litigation After Jesner v. Arab Bank?, HUM. RTS. AT HOME BLOG
(May 8, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2018/05/whither-humanrights-litigation-after-jesner-v-arab-bank.html [https://perma.cc/D29K-E3BV]. But see
Walter Olson, Jesner v Arab Bank: Court Tightens Lid on Alien Tort Statute, CATO INST.
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/jesner-v-arab-bank-court-keeps-lid-alien-tortstatute [https://perma.cc/3BBS-Q4QW].
5
About the Office and the United States Code, OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://uscode.house.gov/about/info.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TP34-32VY]. See generally Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not
Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 283 (2007).
6
See generally Richard J. McKinney, Assistant Law Librarian, Fed. Reserve Bd., The
Authority of Statutes Placed in Section Notes of the U.S. Code, Presentation Before the
3
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But in Jesner, Justice Kennedy attached significance to OLRC’s
placement of the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) as a statutory
note to the ATS.7 He repeatedly referred to the TVPA as a “cause of
action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts.”8 In so
doing, he disregarded longstanding practice and black letter law that the
placement of a statutory note in the U.S. Code by the Office does not have
any substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or
application.9
This error merits correction by the Court for several reasons. Although
it undoubtedly affected Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the ATS in
Jesner, it will also affect future ATS and TVPA cases. In addition, it raises
uncertainty over the status of the countless statutory notes that populate
the federal code. More broadly, this interpretation raises constitutional
concerns by attaching legal significance to OLRC’s placement decisions.
Part I of this Article examines OLRC’s work in preparing the United
States Code. Part II then reviews the Jesner decision, and Part III explains
Justice Kennedy’s misunderstanding of the relationship between the ATS
and TVPA. Finally, Part IV proposes revisions to the Jesner decision that
would provide a more accurate reflection of the legislative record and the
historical role of OLRC in the codification process.
I. THE OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL
AND THE PROCESS OF CODIFICATION
Congress established the Office of Law Revision Counsel in 1974, but
its origins can be traced to the early twentieth century.10 OLRC operates
within the U.S. House of Representatives. Although the Speaker of the
House appoints the Law Revision Counsel, OLRC is non-partisan.11 Its
principal purpose is “to develop and keep current an official and positive
codification of the laws of the United States.” 12 By statute, OLRC’s
functions include the following:

LLSDC Legislative Research Special Interest Section Meeting (May 26, 2011),
http://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/usc-notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB5Q-5MBM].
7
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). The TVPA
provides a federal cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing. It appears as a
statutory note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
9
See NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:14, 347 (7th ed. 2014) (“[H]eadings and notes are not binding, may
not be used to create an ambiguity, and do not control an act’s meaning by injecting a
legislative intent or purpose not otherwise expressed in the law’s body.”).
10
Pub. L. No. 93-554, 88 Stat. 1771 (1974). Efforts to compile federal law can be traced
to the 19th and even the late 18th centuries. See Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t
Find in the United States Code, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 133 (2010).
11
2 U.S.C.S. §§ 285a, 285c (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
12
2 U.S.C.S. § 285a.
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(1) To prepare, and submit to the Committee on the
Judiciary one title at a time, a complete compilation,
restatement, and revision of the general and permanent
laws of the United States which conforms to the
understood policy, intent, and purpose of the Congress in
the original enactments, with such amendments and
corrections as will remove ambiguities, contradictions,
and other imperfections both of substance and of form,
separately stated, with a view to the enactment of each
title as positive law.
(2) To examine periodically all of the public laws enacted
by the Congress and submit to the Committee on the
Judiciary recommendations for the repeal of obsolete,
superfluous, and superseded provisions contained therein.
(3) To prepare and publish periodically a new edition of
the United States Code (including those titles which are
not yet enacted into positive law as well as those titles
which have been so enacted), with annual cumulative
supplements reflecting newly enacted laws.
(4) To classify newly enacted provisions of law to their
proper positions in the Code where the titles involved
have not yet been enacted into positive law.
(5) To prepare and submit periodically such revisions in
the titles of the Code which have been enacted into
positive law as may be necessary to keep such titles
current . . . .13
OLRC plays an important yet obscure role in codifying U.S. law.
When the President signs a bill into law, the Office of the Federal Register
assigns a Public Law number to the new law. 14 These slip laws are
eventually compiled in the Statutes at Large, which are “legal evidence of
laws . . . in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the
Territories and insular possessions of the United States.”15 OLRC works
with the Office of the Federal Register to provide classifications “for
inclusion as side notes . . . in the Statutes at Large.”16 These side notes
13

2 U.S.C.S. § 285b (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
Public Laws, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws [https://perma.cc/34GC-H86L].
15
1 U.S.C.S. § 112 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223). Although the Public Laws that
appear in the Statutes at Large are considered legal evidence of the law, the side notes
indicating their anticipated placement in the United States Code are not part of the
statutory text. E-mail from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House
of Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law (July 17, 2018) (on file with author).
16
About Classification of Laws to the United States Code, OFFICE OF LAW REVISION
COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/about_classificatio
n.xhtml;jsessionid=E20314D11188CB2A3E552D966B94254F [https://perma.cc/NPV22YGP] [hereinafter About Classification].
14
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indicate the anticipated placement of the new laws in the United States
Code.
Because the Statutes at Large are released in chronological order and
are not organized by subject, they are difficult to use in the day-to-day
practice of law.17 To make the law more accessible, OLRC compiles and
arranges the laws that appear in the Statutes at Large into the United States
Code in a process “known as U.S. Code classification.” 18 In many
respects, the purpose of the Code is to organize federal law so it is
manageable and understandable.19 But in contrast to the Statutes at Large,
only those titles of the Code that were specifically enacted by Congress as
a whole are considered positive law and legal evidence of the law.20 All
other titles of the Code are editorial compilations of federal statutes. They
are considered non-positive law titles and are only prima facie evidence of
the law.21
When Congress does not specifically designate the placement of a new
law in the United States Code, OLRC is responsible for the new law’s
placement.22 And, because only Congress can add or amend a section of a
positive law title in the Code, the Office is limited in its ability to place
these new laws in the Code.23 On these occasions, the Office will place
new laws as statutory notes or appendices to existing sections of positive

17

Dorsey, supra note 5, at 284 (“We do not like to read session laws, of course. It can be
tough going.”); see also HOLC Guide to Legislative Drafting, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL,
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafting_Guide.html
[https://perma.cc/VWF5-GRWD] (“The only organizing principle behind the slip laws,
and thus the Statutes at Large, is chronology. This makes it very difficult to find the law
on a particular topic using those sources.”).
18
About Classification, supra note 16. This process actually begins as soon as an enrolled
bill becomes available. Id. The enrolled bill represents the final version of the bill
submitted to the President for signature.
19
See Dorsey, supra note 5, at 284 (emphasis in original) (“The Code is not law; it is a
law locator, and a very useful one.”); see also Charles J. Zinn, Codification of the Laws,
45 L. LIBR. J. 2, 4 (1952) (“We believe that it is our job to make the laws
understandable.”).
20
1 U.S.C.S. § 204(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (“Whenever titles of [the]
Code [] have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the
laws therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the
Territories and insular possessions of the United States.”). See Mary Whisner, The United
States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 L. LIBR. J. 545, 547 (2009).
21
See 1 U.S.C.S. § 204(a). The distinction between legal evidence and prima facie
evidence was described by Charles Zinn, the head of the OLRC in 1957, in the following
manner: “If you go into court and cite a section of the United States Code, your adversary
may bring in a dozen Statutes at Large to show that what is in the Code is not an accurate
statement. As a result, he may prevail because the Statutes at Large are legal evidence of
the law, whereas the Code is only prima facie evidence.” Charles S. Zinn, Revision of the
United States Code, 51 L. LIBR. J. 388, 389–90 (1958).
22
See About Classification, supra note 16.
23
Tress, supra note 10, at 151–52.
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law titles.24 These statutory notes or appendices can include an entire
Public Law or only portions of those laws.25 These placement decisions by
the Office are “a matter of opinion and judgment.”26 The Office considers
various factors in making classification decisions. These decisions are
generally determined by similarities between the new law and existing
Code sections as well as ease of use.27 According to the Office, “[w]e try
to insert the new law in that title of the Code where we think the average
user will be most likely to look for it.”28
Because OLRC, and not Congress, makes these placement decisions,
no legal significance attaches to their location in the Code. Instead, “it is
for the courts to find the meaning of all these statutes, all the amendments
to those statutes, and all the amendments to the amendments.” 29 The
Office has emphatically affirmed these principles:
A provision of a Federal statute is the law whether the
provision appears in the Code as section text or as a
statutory note, and even when it does not appear in the
Code at all. The fact that a provision is set out as a note is
merely the result of an editorial decision and has no effect
on its meaning or validity.30
Three points bear emphasis. First, OLRC is responsible for the
placement of new laws in the U.S. Code when Congress does not
specifically designate their placement in the Code. Second, these new laws
are still binding even if OLRC places them as statutory notes within
existing sections of the Code. Third, courts cannot attach any legal
significance to the specific placement of these new laws in the Code.
Federal courts have long recognized that the placement of statutory
notes by OLRC in the U.S. Code does not affect their meaning. In
numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged these
principles of codification and statutory interpretation.31 In United States v.
24

See About Classification, supra note 16; see also Michael J. Lynch, The U.S. Code, the
Statutes at Large, and Some Peculiarities of Codification, 16 LEGAL REFERENCE SERV.
Q. 69, 77–81 (1997). Some commentators have criticized the use of statutory notes
because they are difficult to locate and undermine the organizational value of the Code.
Tress, supra note 10, at 153.
25
Detailed Guide to the United States Code Content and Features, OFFICE OF THE LAW
REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_
guide.xhtml [https://perma.cc/FSC8-FA6S] [hereinafter Detailed Guide].
26
Zinn, supra note 19, at 3.
27
See About Classification, supra note 16.
28
Zinn, supra note 19, at 3.
29
Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 182 (1986).
30
Detailed Guide, supra note 25.
31
See, e.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod’s Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957)
(quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1912)) (“The change
of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section in two
separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment.
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Welden, for example, the Supreme Court was interpreting the
Appropriations Act of February 25, 1903⎯portions of which were
subsequently codified in the United States Code. 32 The Court was
confronted with two sources of law, which the Court found to be
inconsistent: the original Act of Congress and the subsequent codification
of that law in the Code. In Welden, the Court had to decide which applied.
It concluded that it must rely on the original Act of Congress if there was
an inconsistency between the Statutes at Large and the Code:
Certainly where, as here, the ‘change of arrangement’ was
made by a codifier without the approval of Congress, it
should be given no weight. ‘If construction [of a section of
the United States Code which has not been enacted into
positive law] is necessary, recourse must be had to the
original statutes themselves.’ 33 Accordingly, in order to
construe the immunity provision of the Appropriations Act
of February 25, 1903, we must read it in the context of the
entire Act, rather than in the context of the ‘arrangement’
selected by the codifier.34
Other Supreme Court decisions have made similar determinations, further
highlighting the distinction between Congress and the “codifiers.”35
The lower courts have repeated this understanding regarding the legal
significance of placement decisions in the U.S. Code. In Springs v. Stone,
for example, the federal district court was interpreting the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), which was adopted in response to
the attacks of September 11, 2001.36 Because Congress did not indicate
where the ATSA should be placed in the Code, OLRC placed it as a
statutory note to another federal statute.37 According to the district court,
this placement decision did not affect its interpretation: “[t]he laws of the
United States are evidenced by the Statutes at Large, not by their
placement within the United States Code.”38 Other federal courts have
For it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended
to change their effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.”); Stephan v. United
States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943) (“[T]he Code establishes ‘prima facie’ the laws of the
United States. But the very meaning of ‘prima facie’ is that the Code cannot prevail over
the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”).
32
United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 96 (1964).
33
Id. at 99 n.4 (quoting Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (5th Cir.
1947)).
34
Welden, 377 U.S. at 99 n.4.
35
Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161 (1934) (“The compilers of the Code were not
empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing
so. As to that the command of Congress is too clear to be misread.”).
36
Springs v. Stone, 362 F. Supp. 2d 686, 690 (E.D. Va. 2005).
37
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)).
38
Springs, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 697 n.7.
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made similar determinations, indicating that the placement of a law as a
statutory note in the Code without the approval of Congress “is of no legal
significance,”39 “of no moment,”40 and carries “no weight.”41
In sum, a statutory note’s placement in the United States Code by
OLRC should have no impact on its meaning, interpretation, or
application. Courts may not attach any legal significance to the specific
placement of these new laws in the Code. But, this longstanding practice
and black letter principle were disregarded in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC.
II. THE JESNER DECISION
In Jesner, thousands of victims of terrorist attacks in the Middle East
brought five civil actions under the ATS against Arab Bank, PLC.42 The
plaintiffs alleged Arab Bank had served as a financial intermediary to
several designated terrorist organizations, thereby allowing them to
conduct campaigns of violence against innocent civilians.43 The district
court dismissed the lawsuits in 2015, relying on circuit precedent that
corporations may not be sued under the ATS, and the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal.44 In its decision, the Second Circuit suggested the
Supreme Court was best situated to address the issue of corporate
liability.45 A divided en banc panel of the Second Circuit declined to
rehear the case.46 In a sharply worded dissent from the denial of en banc
review, three judges argued that the Second Circuit’s earlier decision
rejecting corporate liability was a “flawed opinion,” a “lone ‘outlier’
among ATS cases,” and that it was “blunting the natural development of
the law.”47
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
decision and held that foreign corporations are not subject to civil liability
under the ATS. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argued that
federal courts should be reluctant to extend judicially created rights of
action. 48 Such hesitation, which is informed by separation of powers
considerations, should be even more pronounced in cases involving

39

Stadther v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 11-1297, 2012 WL 4372570, at *4 n.1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 7, 2012).
40
Conyers v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41
Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Welden,
377 U.S. 95, 99 (1964)).
42
Two of the five lawsuits also raised claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which
provides a cause of action for acts of international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
43
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
44
In re Arab Bank PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 148, 158 (2d Cir.
2015) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d,
569 U.S. 108 (2013)).
45
See id. at 157.
46
In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016).
47
Id. at 41 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
48
See Jesner, slip op. at 18–19.
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corporate entities and foreign nations.49 In these cases, Justice Kennedy
indicated that courts should defer to the political branches of
government. 50 “[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”51
In Part I of the Jesner opinion, the Court made its initial reference to
the TVPA. The majority examined the development of ATS jurisprudence,
beginning with the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
which held that the ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction in cases of
torture.52 After describing the Filartiga decision, the Court addressed,
albeit briefly, the TVPA:
In the midst of debates in the courts of appeal over whether
the court in Filartiga was correct in holding that plaintiffs
could bring ATS actions based on modern human-rights
laws absent an express cause of action created by an
additional statute, Congress enacted the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).53
The Court indicated the TVPA was “codified as a note following the
ATS” and that it “creates an express cause of action for victims of torture
and extrajudicial killing in violation of international law.” 54 After
describing the adoption of the TVPA, the Court went on to discuss
subsequent developments in ATS jurisprudence, including its decisions in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.55 In
these cases, the Court highlighted the foreign policy implications of ATS
litigation and used this reasoning to narrow the statute’s reach.
In Part II(B)(2) of the Jesner opinion, Justice Kennedy, now joined
only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, returned to the TVPA.
To better interpret the ATS, Justice Kennedy indicated the Court should
look to “analogous statutes for guidance on the appropriate boundaries of
judge-made causes of action.” 56 According to Justice Kennedy, such
references are particularly important in cases involving international law.57
“Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an ATS
common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS
49

Id. at 19, 25–27.
Id. at 19.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 9 (discussing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). In Filartiga,
the Second Circuit held that torture violates international law and that the ATS provides
federal jurisdiction “whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an
alien within our borders . . . .” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
53
Jesner, slip op. at 9 (citations omitted).
54
Id. at 10.
55
Id. at 10–11 (discussing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013)).
56
Jesner, slip op. at 19–20 (citations omitted).
57
Id. at 20 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726).
50
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created by Congress rather than the courts.” 58 In support of this
interpretation, Justice Kennedy referenced the House and Senate reports
for the TVPA and quoted from the House report: “[a]s explained above,
Congress drafted the TVPA to ‘establish an unambiguous and modern
basis for a cause of action’ under the ATS.”59
Having established the connection between the ATS and TVPA,
Justice Kennedy then explained the implications of this connection for
purposes of interpreting the ATS:
Congress took care to delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In
doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of
its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may
be liable, created an exhaustion requirement, and
established a limitations period. In Kiobel, the Court
recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it
significant foreign policy implications.” 60 The TVPA
reflects Congress’ considered judgment of the proper
structure for a right of action under the ATS. Absent a
compelling justification, courts should not deviate from that
model.61
Thus, Justice Kennedy viewed the TVPA as “the only cause of action
under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts.”62 He reiterated
this position by emphasizing that “[t]he TVPA reflects Congress’
considered judgment of the proper structure for a right of action under the
ATS.”63
And, having established a formal connection between the two statutes,
Justice Kennedy went on to graft the TVPA’s restrictions to ATS claims.
“Congress’ decision to exclude liability for corporations in actions brought
under the TVPA is all but dispositive of the present case.” 64 This
ultimately led the Court to hold “foreign corporations may not be
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.”65
Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a lengthy dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan. She questioned the majority’s
approach to corporate liability under international law and argued the
decision would absolve foreign corporations from responsibility for
human rights abuses. 66 According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he text,
58

Jesner, slip op. at 20.
Id. (citation omitted).
60
Id. (citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117).
61
Jesner, slip op. at 20.
62
Id.
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
Id. In an earlier case, the Court held corporations cannot be sued under the TVPA. See
id. (citing Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449 (2012)).
65
Jesner, slip op. at 27.
66
Id. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
59
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history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and consistent history
of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims for law-of-nations
violations may be brought against corporations under the ATS.”67 She also
disagreed with the plurality’s reliance on the TVPA in interpreting the
ATS.68
Jesner represents the Court’s most recent retrenchment of the Alien
Tort Statute. By focusing on the foreign policy implications of ATS
litigation, it follows the reasoning of the Court’s earlier decisions in Sosa
and Kiobel. However, the Court’s reliance on the TVPA to support its
reasoning is different.
III. ASSESSING THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ATS AND TVPA
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Jesner is built upon a
misunderstanding of the TVPA and its relationship to the ATS. In Part I,
the majority opinion indicates the TVPA was “codified as a note following
the ATS . . . .”69 This statement is an accurate description of the TVPA’s
current placement in the United States Code. In Part II(B)(2), however, the
plurality opinion mischaracterizes the relationship between the ATS and
TVPA. According to Justice Kennedy, Congress drafted the TVPA “to
‘establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action’ under
the ATS,” and the TVPA is “the only cause of action under the ATS
created by Congress rather than the courts.”70
In support of these statements, Justice Kennedy cited language from
the House and Senate reports to the TVPA.71 However, the cited language
does not support these statements or reflect the proper relationship
between the two statutes. The House report indicated “[t]he TVPA would
establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has
been successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims Act) . . . .”72 The Senate
Report used nearly identical language. 73 Thus, the House and Senate
Reports did not indicate the TVPA was established, authorized, or adopted
under the ATS. At most, they indicate the ATS inspired the adoption of
the TVPA and that the two statutes were analogous.74 There is certainly
strong support in the legislative record for this limited proposition.75
67

Id.
Id. at 25–29.
69
Id. at 10 (majority opinion).
70
Id. at 20 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5 (1991)).
71
See id.
72
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991) (emphasis added).
73
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991).
74
Both the House and Senate reports reference Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic as the impetus behind the movement to adopt the TVPA.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (discussing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 103 (1985)); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (same). In
Tel-Oren, Judge Bork argued that “an explicit grant of a cause of action” is essential
68
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More significantly, statutory construction must always begin with the
language employed by Congress.76 The TVPA contains no mention of the
ATS.77 Instead, the TVPA’s preamble indicates it was adopted to carry out
U.S. obligations under international law “pertaining to the protection of
human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from
an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” 78 This
language appears in the enrolled bill and the Statutes at Large, but OLRC
omitted the preamble when it placed the TVPA in the U.S. Code. 79
However, the preamble is considered part of the legislative enactment;
therefore, it should be accorded some weight in statutory interpretation.80
The TVPA is also silent on its placement in the U.S. Code. 81
Accordingly, OLRC was responsible for determining its proper placement
in the Code. And, in fact, it was OLRC that placed the TVPA as a
statutory note to the ATS.82 Because Title 28 is a positive law title, the
Office did not have the authority to add or revise any of the existing Code
sections. Thus, it could not amend the language of the ATS or place the
TVPA in a new Code section. It could only attach the TVPA as a statutory
note to an existing section of the Code, which it did at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.83
Under established practice, therefore, the TVPA’s placement as a statutory
note to the ATS has no legal significance when interpreting these statutes.
“before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a
federal tribunal.” Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
75
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5; see also The Torture
Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 34–36 (1988) (prepared statement of Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Committee on International Human Rights).
76
See Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S.
765, 772 (1984) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983)
(citations omitted)). In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that reliance on
legislative history is unnecessary when a statute’s language is clear. See Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 236 n.8 (2010).
77
The enrolled bill does not mention the ATS. See Torture Victim Protection Act, H.R.
2092, 102d Cong. (1992) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 3, 1992).
78
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992).
79
As a general policy, the LRC Office does not include preambles in the U.S. Code. Email from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law (July 17, 2018) (on file with author).
80
See generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:14 (7th ed. 2017).
81
The enrolled bill contains no reference to the United States Code. See Torture Victim
Protection Act, H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. (1992) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 3, 1992). In
contrast, the earliest version of the TVPA did, in fact, address its placement in the Code.
H.R. 4756 would have amended Title 28 of the Code by adding a new section that
granted federal courts jurisdiction over claims of torture or extrajudicial killing. See H.R.
4756, 99th Cong. § 3 (1986). See Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victim Protection
Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 969,
1015–16 (1989) (describing the earlier version of the TVPA).
82
E-mail from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law (June 1, 2018) (on file with author).
83
Id.
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There are, of course, other problems with interpreting the TVPA as a
cause of action under the ATS. As Justice Sotomayor recognized in her
Jesner dissent, “[o]n its face, the TVPA is different from the ATS in
several significant ways.”84 Most significantly, the ATS is a jurisdictional
statute that also grants federal courts limited authority to establish a cause
of action “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”85 The TVPA, by contrast, is
available to both aliens and U.S. citizens, but it only creates a cause of
action for torture and extrajudicial killing.86
If the TVPA is considered a cause of action under the ATS, U.S.
citizens would be unable to bring TVPA claims because the jurisdictional
grant in the ATS only extends to aliens. Presumably, U.S. citizens can rely
on the jurisdictional grant afforded by the federal question statute to bring
TVPA claims.87 However, such a bifurcated approach to TVPA claims is
awkward and there is nothing in the TVPA’s text or legislative history to
support it. For these reasons, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged “[i]t makes
little sense, then, to conclude that the TVPA has dispositive comparative
value in discerning the scope of liability under the ATS.”88
The formal relationship between the two statutes becomes even more
tenuous when considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.89 In Sosa, the Court made clear the ATS functioned
on its own and did not require further implementing legislation.90 To hold
otherwise would have left the ATS a dead letter. According to Justice
Souter:
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress
did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be
placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state
legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of
causes of action or itself decide to make some element of
the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.91

84

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
85
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
86
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73
(1992).
87
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Courts have previously indicated that TVPA claims may
also be brought under the federal question statute. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
246 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995).
88
Jesner, slip op. at 25–26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Mohamad v. Palestinian
Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 458 (2012) (reasoning that the ATS has “no comparative value” in
assessing the meaning of the word “individual” as used in the TVPA).
89
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
90
Id. at 724.
91
Id. at 719.
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When the Court in Sosa addressed the TVPA, it viewed the statute as
distinct from the ATS and reinforced this point with several references to
the TVPA’s legislative history.92
Jesner is not the first case in which this issue has arisen. The D.C.
Circuit previously addressed the relationship between the ATS and TVPA
in Belhas v. Ya’alon, which involved an ATS/TVPA lawsuit brought
against a high-ranking Israeli government official accused of complicity in
the shelling of a U.N. compound in Lebanon that killed dozens of
civilians.93 The court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit
by holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) conferred
immunity upon individuals acting in their official capacity for a foreign
state.94 In considering the plaintiffs’ claims, the court rejected the assertion
that the TVPA abrogated the immunity of foreign government officials.95
It also noted the TVPA did not amend the FSIA.96 In fact, the court
attached some significance to the TVPA’s placement with the ATS and
suggested Congress was responsible for this connection: “When Congress
passed the TVPA in 1991, it did not amend the FSIA and instead
appended it to the ATCA [ATS], a statute the Supreme Court held
in Amerada Hess to be subject to all provisions in the FSIA.”97
In his concurring opinion, Judge Stephen Williams agreed with the
majority’s holding although he took issue with its analysis of the TVPA’s
legislative history.98 He rightly noted the TVPA’s placement in the United
States Code should have no impact on its interpretation:
[T]he majority states that “[w]hen Congress passed the
TVPA in 1991, it did not amend the FSIA and instead
appended it to the ATCA, a statute the Supreme Court held
in Amerada Hess to be subject to all provisions in the
FSIA.” Indeed Congress did not amend the FSIA, but a
further inference of congressional intent from the
placement of the statute within the United States Code is
dubious, at least absent some indication—lacking here—
that Congress itself, rather than simply the Office of Law
Revision Counsel directed that placement.99

92

Id. at 728, 731.
Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S. 305 (2010). The Court in Samantar held that the FSIA does not apply to former
foreign government officials. 560 U.S. at 308.
94
Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1283.
95
Id. at 1288–89.
96
Id. at 1289.
97
Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989)).
98
See Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1293 (Williams, J., concurring).
99
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 1289 (majority opinion)) (first citing Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); then citing 2
U.S.C. §§ 285–285g (2008)).
93
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The Belhas decision reveals the mischief that arises when courts attach
significance to the placement of the TVPA as a statutory note to the
ATS.100 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Jesner both exemplifies
and magnifies this problem.101
IV. REVISING THE JESNER DECISION
In Jesner, Justice Kennedy’s description of the relationship between
the ATS and TVPA is simply wrong. The plurality opinion is particularly
troubling in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that courts
should defer to Congress in these cases because of their foreign policy
implications.102 Instead of relying on Congress, the plurality relies on the
placement decisions of the Office of Law Revision Counsel. The opinion
also raises uncertainty over the status of statutory notes in the United
States Code because it implies their placement in the Code by OLRC is
relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation. For these reasons, the
Court should revise the opinion to correct this error.103

100

Other courts have also mischaracterized the TVPA as an amendment to the ATS. See,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 743 (9th Cir. 2018) (referring to the TVPA as
“an amendment to the Alien Tort Claims Act”).
101
Commentators have made similar misstatements regarding the relationship between
the ATS and TVPA. See, e.g., Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The
Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law Before U.S. Federal Courts, 12
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651, 658 n.29 (2005) (asserting that the TVPA was passed
as an amendment to the ATS); Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship Between the Alien
Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 640, 642
(2010) (“The fact that the TVPA was codified as a note to the ATS implies that they are
intended to interact closely.”); Carole Basri, The Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries:
An Examination of Legal Rights—A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations of Iraqi
Jews, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 656, 715 n.315 (2003) (referring to the TVPA as an
amendment to the ATS); Anthony Blackburn, Striking A Balance to Reform the Alien
Tort Statute: A Recommendation for Congress, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1051, 1070–71
(2013) (“Historically, Congress codified the TVPA as a note to the ATS, which implies
intent for them to interact closely.”).
102
See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 18–19 (U.S. Apr. 24,
2018) (“The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional
capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
727 (2004) (“While the absence of congressional action addressing private rights of
action under an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a
right when it creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making
international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.”).
103
This proposal shares some of the features of recent scholarship that rewrites important
judicial decisions. See, e.g., FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
(Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010); INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE:
REWRITING HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS (Eva Brems & Ellen Desment eds., 2017); WHAT
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack Balkin ed.,
2002). Unlike prior scholarship, however, this proposal asks the Court to revise its own
opinion.
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The Supreme Court often revises its opinions after they are issued.104
This controversial practice occurs for various reasons. On some occasions,
the Court is simply correcting grammatical or format errors.105 But on
other occasions, these revisions are more substantive. 106 Although the
Court has engaged in this practice for many years, it only began
publicizing its revisions in 2015.107 Most commentators appear to support
this practice as long as it is transparent.108
In fact, the Court has already made some revisions to its Jesner
decision. Six days after the Court issued its original decision, it released a
revised version of the decision on its website.109 Minor corrections, which
did not affect the Court’s reasoning or holding, were made to the opinions
of Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor.110
The plurality’s position on the relationship between the ATS and
TVPA merits similar treatment. The following revisions would address
this error without requiring any additional drafting. These revisions would
appear on page twenty of Justice Kennedy’s slip opinion and would
simply delete the language that refers to the TVPA as a cause of action
under the ATS:
Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an
ATS common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of
action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the
courts. As explained above, Congress drafted the TVPA to
“establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of
action” under the ATS. H. R. Rep., at 3; S. Rep., at 4–5.
104

See Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 540, 555 (2014) (“[T]he Court makes all sorts of revisions, ranging from the most
mundane to the most intriguing, with the vast majority not surprisingly falling into the
first category.”); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Post-Decision Revisions of Supreme Court
Decisions, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/25/post-decisionrevisions-of-supreme-court-opinions/?utm_term=.120d0b665b69
[https://perma.cc/5CMU-ACMF]; Adam Liptak, Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme
Court Keeps Editing, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/
us/final-word-on-us-law-isnt-supreme-court-keeps-editing.html [https://perma.cc/DS2QKCBS].
105
Lazarus, supra note 104, at 562–63.
106
Id. at 569–73.
107
Ryan Gabrielson, Legal Footnote: You Have to Look Hard to See the Supreme Court
Correct Its Mistakes, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 2, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/legal-footnote-you-have-to-look-hard-to-see-the-supreme-court-correct-itsmistakes [https://perma.cc/W7BA-MRBM].
108
See Charles Rothfeld, Should the Supreme Court Correct its Mistakes?, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 56, 61–62 (2014) (suggesting that the Court should disclose “every change that it
makes to every opinion after initial publication”).
109
See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-499diff_868c.pdf (providing original
version next to revised version and noting revisions).
110
See id. at 9 (replacing “Peruvian” with “Paraguayan”); id. at 10 n.3 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (making formatting corrections).
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Congress took care to delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In
doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of
its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may
be liable, created an exhaustion requirement, and
established a limitations period. In Kiobel, the Court
recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it
significant foreign policy implications.” The TVPA reflects
Congress’ considered judgment of the proper structure for a
right of action under the ATS. Absent a compelling
justification, courts should not deviate from that model.111
These revisions can be presented to the Reporter of Decisions at the
Supreme Court, who could “then refer the matter to the appropriate Justice
for consideration.”112 The revisions could easily be made before the final,
official text of the Court’s opinion is released.113 Past practice suggests
such revisions could be made without the need for rehearing or even prior
notice to the parties.114
Significantly, these revisions would not change the outcome of the
Jesner case. Foreign corporations would still be immune from civil
liability under the ATS. But, these revisions would eliminate the
inaccuracies regarding the placement of the TVPA and its relationship to
the ATS.
If the Supreme Court does not remedy this error, the lower courts
should not repeat it. Quite simply, the plurality opinion’s understanding of
the connection between the ATS and TVPA is wrong. Although the lower
courts remain bound by the Court’s limited holding in Jesner, they are
certainly not bound to recognize a connection between the ATS and
TVPA that does not exist.115 Recognition is even less warranted in light of
the plurality’s limited reach, particularly when the three votes of the
plurality on this issue are compared with the four votes of the dissent that
reject the connection. Accordingly, the reasoning behind the Jesner
111

See Jesner, slip op. at 20 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Kiobel v.
Royal Duty Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013)).
112
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 32 (10th ed. 2013).
113
See Information About Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/info_opinions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SWP7TY86] (describing the process by which Supreme Court opinions are released to the
public and printed). Justice Kennedy’s retirement may complicate such efforts although
the Court presumably has some mechanism for addressing these situations. Although the
Court could also clarify this issue in a future case, there is no guarantee the Court will
address an ATS or TVPA case in the near future, if at all.
114
Lazarus, supra note 104, at 566–72.
115
There are occasions when lower courts may deviate from Supreme Court precedent.
See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (assessing the reasons for hierarchical
precedent); Timothy Schwartz, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore
Controlling Precedent, 56 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2007) (examines the phenomena of judges
ignoring precedent).
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decision should be extended with great caution in other ATS and TVPA
cases.116
CONCLUSION
Attaching significance to the placement of a statutory note in the
United States Code poses risks. It can imply connections that Congress did
not intend, thereby affecting statutory interpretation. But it can also have
constitutional implications because it conflates OLRC decisions with
congressional action. This is precisely what happened in Jesner. This
outcome is particularly ironic because the Supreme Court has repeatedly
admonished lower courts to defer to Congress in ATS and TVPA cases.
For these reasons, OLRC’s placement decisions should have no bearing in
statutory interpretation.
Correcting Jesner’s evident error would ensure that future cases
involving the ATS and TVPA are informed by the will of Congress
instead of the decisions of the Office of Law Revision Counsel. More
broadly, these revisions would reaffirm longstanding practice regarding
the proper interpretation of statutory notes in the United States Code.

116

Lower courts presented with ATS or TVPA cases could, for example, give a narrow
construction to the plurality’s reasoning in Jesner, if they give it any weight at all. See
generally Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of
Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 (2014) (arguing that stare decisis is not
always applied consistently by the courts); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (criticizing the current
approach to stare decisis and suggesting a new, more refined theory); Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2014) (discussing
lower courts’ practice of narrowly interpreting Supreme Court precedent and indicating
that the practice can be acceptable when lower courts adopt reasonable interpretations).

